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Historical epistemology is a form of intellectual history focused on “the history of categories 
that structure our thought, pattern our arguments and proofs, and certify our standards for 
explanation” (Lorraine Daston). Under this umbrella, historians have been studying the 
changing meanings of “objectivity,” “impartiality,” “curiosity,” and other virtues believed to 
be conducive to good scholarship. While endorsing this historicization of virtues and their 
corresponding vices, the present paper argues that the meaning and relative importance of 
these virtues and vices can only be determined if the r mutual dependencies are taken into 
account. Drawing on a detailed case study – a controve sy that erupted among nineteenth-
century Orientalists over the publication of R. P. A. Dozy’s De Israëlieten te Mekka (The 
Israelites in Mecca, 1864) – the paper shows that nineteenth-century Orientalists were careful 
to examine (1) the degree in which Dozy practiced the virtues they considered most important, 
(2) the extent to which these virtues were kept in balance by other ones, (3) the extent to 
which these virtues were balanced by other scholars’ virtues, and (4) the extent to which they 
were expected to be balanced by future scholars’ work. Consequently, this paper argues that 
historical epistemology might want to abandon its single-virtue focus so as to allow balances, 
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In December 1863, Karl Marx paid a visit to his Dutch uncle Lion Philips in Zaltbommel.1 
One of the striking things he discovered during his stay in this Dutch city was that Biblical 
criticism made quite a furor in the Netherlands, not only among academic theologians, but 
also among liberal Protestant pastors who welcomed Biblical criticism as a means for 
liberating religious practice from what they perceived as the “chains” of dogma and tradition.2 
“Here in Holland,” Marx wrote in January 1864 to Friedrich Engels, “the German critical-
theological tendency is so very much à l’ordre du jour that the parsons acknowledge it openly 
                                                          
1 A draft of this paper was presented at the “Nineteen h and Twentieth-Century Philological 
Encounters” conference at Leiden University on 5 June 2014. I would like to thank the 
audience on that occasion for their helpful feedback as well as Henning Trüper, the editors of 
this journal, and four anonymous reviewers for important queries and suggestions. Unless 
otherwise noted, all translations are mine. Funding was generously provided by the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). 
2 “Liberal theology” is the customary English rendering of what, from the 1850s onwards, 
was known in the Netherlands as “moderne theologie.” S e, e.g., [D. Th. Huet], Wenken 
opzigtelijk moderne theologie (The Hague, 1858) and the debate elicited by this anonymous 
pamphlet. Although liberal theologians in the 1850s and 1860s fought several battles at once, 
their uncompromising commitment to Biblical criticism was one of their most important and 
most contested hallmarks. See Mirjam Buitenwerf-van der Molen, God van vooruitgang: de 
popularisering van het modern-theologische gedachtegoed in Nederland (1857-1880) 
(Hilversum, 2007), 34. 
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from the pulpits.”3 At that time, the Protestant pastor in Zaltbommel was J. G. R. Acquoy, a 
future professor of church history at Leiden University, who was wholeheartedly committed 
to the liberal cause and did not hesitate, indeed, to share his views with his congregation.4 
More remarkable, however, was the case that Marx report d to Engels just a couple of months 
later. The Leiden Orientalist Reinhart Dozy had dare  to publish a book in which he relegated 
the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob to the realm of fancy, portrayed the ancient Israelites 
as archaic idolaters, treated the first five books f the Bible as religious mythology, and on top 
of that equated the famous Black Stone of the Kaaba with a stone god originally worshipped 
by the Israelite tribe of Simeon. They write me from Holland, Marx added, “that the book has 
caused a great uproar among theologians there, particul ly since Dozy is the most learned 
Dutch Orientalist – and a professor in Leiden to bot!”5 
 The heated debate sparked by Dozy’s book De Israëlieten te Mekka (The Israelites in 
Mecca, 1864) among Dutch and foreign scholars alike – German, French, and English voices 
quickly joined the discussion – was not only a theological dispute. Although both admirers 
and opponents treated the book as a specimen of modern Biblical criticism with implications 
                                                          
3 Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels, 20 January 1864, in The Letters of Karl Marx, trans. Saul K. 
Padover (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1979), 177. 
4 J. G. R. Acquoy, Jezus Christus de waarheid: leerrede (Arnhem, 1863); idem, Jezus 
tegenover de ouden: leerrede (Arnhem, 1867). See also H. C. Rogge, “Johannes Gerardus 
Rijk Acquoy,” Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen gevestigd te 
Amsterdam 1897 (Amsterdam, 1898), 57-96, at 69-70. 
5 Marx to Engels, 16 June 1864, in Letters of Karl Marx, 186 (translation slightly modified). 
Marx’s source of information was Leon Philips’s letter of 12 June 1864, published in Jan 
Gielkens, Karl Marx und seine niederländischen Verwandten: eie kommentierte 
Quellenedition (Trier, 1999), 196-7. 
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for the study of Islam, the debate was also an extensiv  reflection on the extent to which 
Dozy’s bold suggestions and hazardous inferences were compatible with standards of serious 
scholarship. Dozy’s book became a cause célèbre, well beyond academic circles,6 not merely 
because of its iconoclastic agenda, but also becaus  senior scholar with a well-established 
reputation for philological accuracy was suddenly being criticized, often in remarkably strong 
language, for violating elementary scholarly standards. Interestingly, Dozy’s critics as well as 
his supporters discussed these standards almost invariably in terms of virtues and vices. Was 
Dozy a model of “frankness,” as the Leiden Old Testament scholar Abraham Kuenen 
asserted? Or was Dozy guilty of “prejudice” and “dogmatism,” as other critics maintained, 
because he adapted sources to his own purposes and hardly considered alternative 
interpretative strategies? Was his “shrewdness” to be applauded or did it come too close to 
“recklessness” and “rashness” to deserve endorsement? One wonders: What did these virtues 
and vices mean? And why were categories of virtue and vice so important in evaluating De 
Israëlieten te Mekka? 
 The Dozy affair has, of course, not gone unnoticed by historians of nineteenth-century 
Orientalism. Most notably, Ran HaCohen has examined how German-Jewish intellectuals 
responded to Dozy’s provocative study, mapping their praise and blame for De Israëlieten te 
Mekka on a confessional map between “orthodoxy” and “liberalism.”7 Additionally, Arnoud 
Vrolijk and Richard van Leeuwen have argued that personal factors, such as Dozy’s fondness 
                                                          
6 According to [W. G. C.] Byvanck, “R. Fruin (II),” De Gids, 63 (1899), II, i-xxxvi, at xxxi n. 
1, Dozy’s book was even prescribed to grammar school students. 
7 Ran HaCohen, Reclaiming the Hebrew Bible: German-Jewish Reception of Biblical 
Criticism, trans. M. Engel (Berlin, 2010), 140-51. 
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for polemics, fueled the debate no less than clashing political and religious agendas.8 None of 
these authors, however, have paid more than cursory attention to the language of virtue and 
vice that Dozy and his colleagues employed. From a disciplinary-historical perspective, this is 
perfectly understandable. The catalogues of virtues and vices on which Dozy’s critics drew in 
evaluating De Israëlieten te Mekka re likely to reflect, in one way or another, the political, 
religious, and methodological fault lines that divied European Orientalists in the 1860s. 
These lines of division, in turn, have been extensively analyzed by Suzanne Marchand, Sabine 
Mangold, and others historians of nineteenth-century Orientalism.9 If the “shrewdness,” 
“frankness,” and “rashness” attributed to Dozy merely offer further illustrations of this by 
now familiar diversity – the “house divided against it elf,” as Robert Irwin calls it10 – 
historians of Orientalism have little reason to subject discourses of virtue and vice to special 
scrutiny. 
 If I embark on such a project nonetheless, I do so with the rather different purpose of 
making a methodological contribution to an emerging f eld of intellectual history known as 
“historical epistemology.” Although this label can refer to different lines of inquiry,11 I follow 
                                                          
8 Arnoud Vrolijk and Richard van Leeuwen, Arabic Studies in the Netherlands: A Short 
History in Portraits, 1580-1950, trans. Alastair Hamilton (Leiden, 2014), 97, 102. 
9 Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and 
Scholarship (Cambridge, 2009), 102-56; Sabine Mangold, Eine “weltbürgerliche 
Wissenschaft” : die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert (S uttgart, 2004), 78-115.  
10 Robert Irwin, For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and Their Enemi s (London, 2007), 
189-236. 
11 As Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm explain, historical epistemology has alternately been 
defined as the historical study of (1) epistemological concepts like objectivity, (2) 
epistemological objects like DNA, and (3) long-term scientific developments. Uljana Feest 
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Lorraine Daston in understanding historical epistemology to be a form of intellectual history 
focused on “the history of categories that structure our thought, pattern our arguments and 
proofs, and certify our standards for explanation.”12 Daston’s study Objectivity, co-authored 
with Peter Galison, illustrates this line of research by examining in detail the changing 
meanings that nineteenth and twentieth-century scholars attributed to “objectivity.” Daston 
historicizes this virtue by showing, among other things, that late nineteenth-century accounts 
of “mechanical objectivity” differed significantly from objectivity in an early nineteenth-
century sense of “truth to nature.”13 Following Daston’s example, other historians have 
examined what virtues such as “impartiality,” “curiosity,” and “humility” meant in different 
times and places.14 This contextualizing approach is a welcome challenge to the often rather 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Thomas Sturm, “What (Good) is Historical Epistemology?” Erkenntnis, 75 (2011), 285-
302, at 288. 
12 Lorraine Daston, “Historical Epistemology,” in James Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and 
Harry Harootunian, eds., Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the 
Disciplines (Chicago, 1994), 282-9, at 282. 
13 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York, 2007). 
14 Kathryn Murphy and Anita Traninger, eds., The Emergence of Impartiality (Leiden, 2014); 
Sari Kivistö, The Vices of Learning: Morality and Knowledge at Early Modern Universities 
(Leiden, 2014). See also Kathryn M. Olesko, Physics as a Calling: Discipline and Practice in 
the Königsberg Seminar for Physics (Ithaca, NY, 1991), 366-450 on nineteenth-century 
virtues of exactitude. Histories of scholarly values, as distinguished from virtues and vices, 
can be found in M. Norton Wise, ed., The Values of Precision (Princeton, 1995) and Michael 
Hagner and Manfred D. Laubichler, eds., Der Hochsitz des Wissens: das Allgemeine als 
wissenschaftlicher Wert (Zurich, 2006). 
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universal terms in which contemporary virtue epistemologists, among others, speak about the 
role of “epistemic virtues” in scholarly inquiry.15 
Historicizing single virtues, however, is only a first step towards understanding what it 
meant for a scholar such as Dozy to be accused of “rashness” and “dogmatism” or to be 
praised for his “shrewdness” while simultaneously being criticized for “inaccurate” historical 
statements. Daston and her colleagues hardly if ever examine to what extent nineteenth-
century authors saw virtues as mutually dependent, in these sense that both the meaning and 
the relative significance of a virtue depended on those of other, complementary or contrasting 
ones. While Daston’s historical epistemology convincingly shows that virtues must always be 
situated in time and place, it contributes only little o answering such questions as: How 
important was “accuracy” in relation to “fruitfulness”? To what extent did “impartiality” 
imply “transparency”? What was a “talent for conjecture” worth without “carefulness”? And 
was it regarded as legitimate for scholars to excel in some virtues (say, frankness) at the cost 
of others (say, precision)?16 
                                                          
15 On which see Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue 
Epistemology (Oxford, 2011) and John Greco and John Turri, eds., Virtue Epistemology: 
Contemporary Readings (Cambridge, MA, 2012). 
16 Although Daston and Galison admit that epistemic virtues may collide or otherwise stand in 
tension with each other, they suggest that such tensions are more likely to occur “at the level 
of specific, workaday choices” (Objectivity, 28) than on the ideal-typical level on which their 
study mostly operates. At the latter level, the primary form of tension that Daston encounters 
takes the form of friction between “old” and “new” ideals – between the ancient virtue of 
impartiality and the mid-nineteenth-century virtue of objectivity, for example. See Lorraine 
Daston, “Objectivity and Impartiality: Epistemic Virtues in the Humanities,” in Rens Bod, 
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These are no hypothetical questions. As I will argue in what follows, nineteenth-
century scholars such as Dozy’s critics did not define their work in terms of single virtues, but 
conceived of scholarly performances in terms of weighing and balancing multiple virtues. The 
debate on Dozy’s De Israëlieten te Mekka even suggests four ways in which virtues were seen 
as depending on each other. The extent to which scholars appreciated Dozy’s “shrewdness” 
and “frankness” was dependent on (1) the degree in wh ch Dozy practiced these virtues, (2) 
the extent to which they were kept in balance by other virtues, (3) the extent to which they 
were balanced by other scholars’ virtues, and (4) the extent to which it was expected that they 
would be balanced by future scholars’ work. If this is, in one way or another, representative of 
how nineteenth-century scholars more generally conceived of virtues, vices, and their mutual 
relations, then historians have a good reason for abandoning the single virtue-focus that has 
dominated historical epistemology so far in favor of the broader, more open-ended question 
what sort of constellations of virtues scholars appealed to in defining scholarly standards and 
in evaluating each other’s work. Historical epistemology may then enter a new phase in which 
balances, hierarchies, and other dependency relations between such virtues as “accuracy,” 
“frankness,” and “shrewdness” move to the center of attention. 
 
Dozy and his book 
Who, first of all, was the man who created such a stir with De Israëlieten te Mekka?17 
Reinhart Dozy’s biography conformed almost seamlessly to the narrative template of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Jaap Maat, and Thijs Weststeijn, eds., The Making of the Humanities, vol. 3 (Amsterdam, 
2014), 27-41. 
17 On Dozy’s life, see Johann Fück, Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 
20. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1955), 181-5; J. Brugman, “Dozy, a Scholarly Life According to 
Plan,” in Willem Otterspeer, ed., Leiden Oriental Connections, 1850-1940 (Leiden, 1989), 
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nineteenth-century scholarly life.18 Born in 1820, Dozy studied at Leiden University with the 
Arabic scholar Hendrik Engelinus Weijers. He won a golden medal of the Royal Institute at 
Amsterdam for his Dictionnaire détaillé des noms des vêtements chez les Arabes (1843, 
published in 1845) and obtained his Ph.D. degree in 1844 with a study on the Abbadid 
dynasty in Muslim Spain. Two years later, Dozy was made assistant curator of the collection 
of Oriental manuscripts in Leiden’s university library (adiutor interpretis legati Warneriani). 
After publishing his Recherches sur l’histoire politique et littéraire dl’Espagne pendant le 
moyen âge in 1848, he was appointed to a special chair in “geeral history” at Leiden, which 
allowed Dozy to teach not only on his beloved medieval Spain, but also, following his 
fascination for all things French, on Napoleon and French poetry.19 In 1857, he received a full 
professorship, which he kept until his death in 1883, shortly after the completion of a two-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
62-81; Catrien G. Santing, “De middeleeuwen met een phrygische muts: de geschiedvisie van 
Reinart [sic] Dozy en Willem Jonckbloet,” Theoretische Geschiedenis, 26 (1999), 220-37; 
Vrolijk and Van Leeuwen, Arabic Studies, 95-102. 
18 On the discursive power of such biographical templates among mid-nineteenth-century 
scholars at Leiden, see Herman Paul, “’Werken zoo lang het dag is’: sjablonen van een 
negentiende-eeuws geleerdenleven,” in L. J. Dorsman and P. J. Knegtmans, eds., De
menselijke maat in de wetenschap: de geleerden(auto)biografie als bron voor de 
wetenschaps- en universiteitsgeschiedenis (H lversum, 2013), 53-73. 
19 See the lecture notes made by the future historian P. J. Blok, in Leiden University Library 
(hereafter: LUL), BPL 2982. Blok’s opinions on these courses were not particularly 
favorable: “From a scholarly point of view, Dozy’s entertaining historical lectures were a 
poor affair.” Quoted in H. Brugmans, “Levensbericht van P. J. Blok,” in Jaarboek der 
Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen gevestigd te Amsterdam 1930-1931 (Amsterdam, 
1931), 1-30, at 6. 
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volume Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes (1881). Together with Dozy’s four-volume 
Histoire des Musulmans d’Espagne (1861), this is regarded as his best and most influe tial 
work.20 
These monographic studies as well as the source editions Dozy published – he 
undertook editions of Abdelwahid al-Marrakushi’s hitory of the Almohades (1847) and Ibn 
Idhari’s Al-Bayan al-Mughrib (1848-1851), among other titles – testify to the “philological 
ethos” that dominated the study of history, languages, and religion in mid-nineteenth-century 
Leiden. It was an ethos in which source criticism stood in higher regard than historical 
synthesis, accuracy counted as more important than originality, and a healthy skepticism, 
especially vis-à-vis traditional authority, was seen as the beginning of all wisdom (“I am 
nothing if not critical” was a favorite Shakespeare quotation in nineteenth-century Leiden).21 
                                                          
20 The influential German Orientalist Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer reviewed Dozy’s work in 
great detail in his “Studien über Dozy’s Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes” (1881-6), in 
Fleischer, Kleinere Schriften, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1888), 470-781 and vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1888), 1-
102. According to M. J. de Goeje, “Levensbericht van Reinhart Dozy,” in Jaarboek van de 
Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen gevestigd te Amsterdam voor 1883 (Amsterdam, 
[1884]), 12-52, at 47, Dozy was particularly satisified with Fleischer’s praise. 
21 Herman Paul, “The Scholarly Self: Ideals of Intellectual Virtue in Nineteenth-Century 
Leiden,” in Rens Bod, Jaap Maat, and Thijs Weststeijn, ds., The Making of the Humanities, 
vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 2012), 397-411. The line from Shakespeare’s Othello was approvingly 
quoted by the historian Robert Fruin in his Af cheidsrede bij het nederleggen van het 
hoogleeraarsambt aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden,  1sten juni 1894 uitgesproken (The 
Hague, 1894), 28 and attributed to Abraham Kuenen by C. P. Tiele, Elements of the Science 
of Religion, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1897), 17. The term “philological ethos” is borrowed from 
Rainer Kolk, “Wahrheit, Methode, Charakter: zur wissenschaftlichen Ethik der Germanistik 
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Dozy’s source editions also furnished the author with a solid reputation among European 
Arabists. Such a reputation mattered, because trust played an important role in philological 
scholarship. To no small degree, scholars guaranteed the reliability of a transcript or an 
inference with their own good name.22 This explains why Dozy’s reputation was frequently 
invoked in the debate prompted by De Israëlieten te Mekka, as a reason why the book 
generated much interest,23 as a guarantee that it could not be entirely wrong-headed,24 as a 
reason why it deserved serious study,25 or as a cause of surprise (that “a man of such first-rate 
manly learning” was able to produce such “wild, youthf l leaps and bounds”).26 Dozy’s 
reputation was also seen as deserving respectful treatment. Thus, when the German rabbi 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
im 19. Jahrhundert,” Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur, 14 
(1989), 50-73, who in turn derives it from Franz Schultz, “Die Entwicklung der 
Literaturwissenschaft von Herder bis Wilhelm Scherer,” in Emil Ermatinger, ed., Philosophie 
der Literaturwissenschaft (Berlin, 1930), 1-42, at 37. 
22 Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, “Inventing the Archive: T stimony and Virtue in Modern 
Historiography,” History of the Human Sciences, 26/4 (2013), 8-26, at 9-11; Steven Shapin, A 
Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, 
1994), 65-125. 
23 J. C. Matthes, “Eene nieuwe ontdekking,” De Tijdspiegel (1864), II, 349-69, at 349. 
24 [Aloys Sprenger], review in Das Ausland, 37 (1864) 773-6, at 773 and, in almost identical 
wording, the anonymous review in The Methodist Quarterly Review, 48 (1865), 120-1, at 121. 
25 [Gustav Weil], review in Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur, 57 (1864), 595-602, at 
596. 
26 [Petrus Hofstede de] G[root], “De oorsprong van de Mohamedaansche godsdienst,” 
Waarheid in Liefde (1865), 373-6, at 373. See also M. Jastrow’s review in the Monatsschrift 
für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, 13 (1864), 313-17, at 314. 
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Ludwig Philippson expressed his doubts about the soundness of Dozy’s mind after reading De 
Israëlieten te Mekka,27 the German-Jewish scholar Raphael Kirchheim rebuked him, under 
reference to the author’s reputation, not to write “in such a rejecting, dismissive tone” about 
the famous Dutch Orientalist, “as if he has was dealing with one of the savants of the Mainzer 
Kladderadatsch.”28 
Philological virtuosity, however, was only one aspect of Dozy’s reputation. Like many 
of his generation, Dozy was “caught between romanticism and historicism, between its grand 
political and aesthetic dreams and its desire to be counted wissenschaftlich.”29 Despite his 
commitment to the minuteness and exactness favored by the philological ethos, Dozy 
preferred to model himself after such Romantic French historians as Prosper de Barante and 
Augustin Thierry. He also valued a well-polished writing style over masses of learned 
footnotes and did not shrink, to the astonishment of some of his Leiden colleagues, from using 
poetry as an historical source.30 Additionally, Dozy had a sharp tongue, judging by his letters, 
some of which were punctuated with Arabic curses,31 and by his sometimes ruthlessly critical 
                                                          
27 [Ludwig Philippson], review in Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums, 28 (1864), 589-90, at 
589. 
28 Raphael Kirchheim, review in Ben Chananja, 7 (1864), 974-7 and 1000-01, at 975. The 
Kladderadatsch (1848-1944) was a German satirical periodical. 
29 Marchand, German Orientalism, 138. 
30 Santing, “Middeleeuwen,” 221, 225; Brugman, “Dozy,” 72. 
31 Manuela Marín, “Scholarship and Criticism: The Letters of Reinhart Dozy to Pascual de 
Gayangos (1841-1852),” in Cristina Alvarez Millán ad Claudia Heide, eds., Pascual de 
Gayangos: A Nineteenth-Century Spanish Arabist (Edinburgh, 2008), 68-85, at 85 n. 52. 
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reviews, through which he alienated several colleagu s near and abroad.32 In his Recherches, 
most notably, Dozy lashed out so harshly at the Spanish Orientalist José Antonio Conde that 
he acquired the dubious reputation of being “a merciless controversialist.”33 
The proverbial whirlwind that Dozy had to reap after this wind came with De 
Israëlieten te Mekka. This book emerged out of Het islamisme (Islamism, 1863), a popular 
introduction to the history of Islam that Dozy contributed to a series on “The Most Important 
Religions” published by A. C. Kruseman.34 During his preparations for this work of synthesis, 
Dozy arrived at what he called revolutionary insights into the origins of Islam. As he wrote 
Kruseman, his publisher, in November 1862: “The result at which I have now arrived is, I 
think, rather surprising, also for Biblical theology; it is also important, because it puts the 
origin of Islam in a new light.”35 Although in Het islamisme, Dozy did not yet present his 
changed views, he promised his readers a more detailed exposition of what he had discovered: 
 
In this way, I have obtained a result that has utterly surprised me, but that cannot be 
communicated in just a few pages, given that it is clo ely related to many other, 
arguably even more important results; it is entirely at odds with reigning views; it 
                                                          
32 See, e.g., ibid., 79-80; LUL, BPL 2487, P. J. Veth to Dozy, 10 December 1843 and 3 
January 1846. 
33 Irwin, For Lust of Knowing, 175. See also Brugman, “Dozy,” 66; Daniël van der Zande, 
“Martinus Th. Houtsma, 1851-1943: een bijdrage aan de geschiedenis van de oriëntalistiek in 
Nederland en Europa” (Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht University, 1999), 129; Vrolijk and Van 
Leeuwen, Arabic Studies, 95-7. 
34 On this series: Arie L. Molendijk, The Emergence of the Science of Religion in the 
Netherlands (Leiden, 2005), 62-3. 
35 LUL, LTK 1505, Dozy to A. C. Kruseman, 26 November 1862. 
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sounds very strange, and given that in the realm of scholarship no one can demand to 
be taken on his word, it requires a lengthy, scholarly demonstration of proof…36 
 
Dozy’s closest pupil, Michaël Jan de Goeje, who followed the project from nearby, had the 
exciting feeling of accompanying a discoverer: “Almost every day brought something new. 
Everywhere new perspectives revealed themselves, on riddle after another came to a 
solution.”37 Also, Dozy’s correspondence shows that colleagues impatiently begged for quick 
dispatch of the results.38 When these were eventually published, De Goeje declared in 
superlatives: “In this book, we receive a series of revelations regarding the darkest and most 
enigmatic issues; it provides a key to penetralia on which one had never hoped to behold; it 
has removed obstacles that one perceived to be insurmountable as if by magic.”39 
                                                          
36 R. Dozy, Het islamisme (Haarlem, 1863), 2. 
37 De Goeje, “Levensbericht van Reinhart Dozy,” 37-8. 
38 LUL, BPL 2487, Abraham Geiger to Dozy, 16 June 1864 and undated (1864). Writing to 
Michaël Jan de Goeje, Theodor Nöldeke adopted a more reserved stance: “Between the two of 
us, I have to admit that I do not expect much of the new discoveries that have been promised.” 
LUL, BPL 2389, 1 May 1864 (I owe this reference to Christiaan Engberts). 
39 M. J. de Goeje, “Een stap vooruit,” De Gids, 28 (1864), II, 297-312, at 298. Dozy himself 
spoke in no less exalted prose about “an entire seri s of discoveries, of a kind I had never 
made before and had never dared to hope for; discoveries that I trust will receive an honorable 
place among the great scholarly results achieved in this century, which shall break new 
grounds in philology, the history of humankind, and the history of religion. I have literally 




 Dozy’s most revolutionary hypothesis was that the Kaaba stone in Mecca had 
originally been an ancient Israelite stone god that t e Israelite tribe of Simeon had exported to 
Arabia in the days of king Saul. On etymological grounds, Dozy supposed that the famous 
“Meccan festival” had been established by these Simeonites after the example of the Baal 
feasts in ancient Israel, long before the introduction of Jewish monotheism in the time of Ezra. 
If ancient tradition was right to identify the Baal in Mecca with a stone in a hole, then Dozy 
believed this to correspond almost neatly to Israel’s ancient history. For in Dozy’s view, 
Abraham and Sarah had not been historical figures, but Hebrew designations for “stone” and 
“hole,” respectively, referring to a stone god and the pit in which this deity resided. The 
Leiden professor had no difficulty explaining why Genesis personified this stone and this pit 
into a patriarch and matriarch: this had been the work of editors in the days of Ezra, who 
rejected such a primitive stone worship from the monotheistic perspective to which Israel had 
converted after the Babylonian exile. Accordingly, for Dozy, the entire ancient history of 
Israel, as described in the Pentateuch, had been an inve tion of tradition by “Ezra and his 
helpers.”40 
 
An international debate 
Although some of Dozy’s speculative conjectures raied many an eyebrow, it was actually not 
very surprising to find a Leiden professor in the 1860s applying techniques of modern 
Biblical criticism to questions related to the origins of Islam. First of all, by 1864, the Leiden 
theological faculty had a reputation for being at the forefront of Old Testament scholarship. It 
was here that students from all over the world came to study with Abraham Kuenen, whose 
work contributed significantly to the “documentary h pothesis” often associated with the 
                                                          
40 R. Dozy, De Israëlieten te Mekka van Davids tijd tot in de vijfde eeuw onzer tijdrekening 
(Haarlem, 1864), 8. 
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names of Karl Heinrich Graf (on whom more below) and Julius Wellhausen (a great admirer 
of Kuenen).41 For much the same reason, orthodox Calvinists in the Netherlands as well as 
abroad distrusted all that came from Leiden, lamenting the faculty’s betrayal of Reformed 
orthodoxy.42 As a former South African student reported back to Kuenen in 1863: “For me, 
my stay in Leiden has become a cause of much sorrow. . . . Even before my return to the 
Cape, I had acquired the reputation of being an heretic teacher [dwaalleeraar].” 43 Secondly, 
by the early 1860s, the origins of Islam had been capturing the fascination of Orientalists for 
some decades already, as evidenced by Abraham Geiger’s and Gustav Weil’s much-discussed 
studies in this area.44 Of crucial importance, however, was the 1860 publication of Theodor 
Nöldeke’s Geschichte des Qorâns. Building on Geiger and Weil, among others, Nöldeke 
radicalized their “historical-critical” treatment of the Islamic holy book by separating Medina-
era and Mecca-era texts as radically as Old Testament scholars distinguished between “J” 
                                                          
41 P. B. Dirksen and A. van der Kooij, eds., Abraham Kuenen (1828-1891): His Major 
Contributions to the Study of the Old Testament: A Collection of Old Testament Studies 
Published on the Occasion of the Centenary of Abraham Kuenen’s Death (10 December 
1991) (Leiden, 1993). 
42 E.g., Is. da Costa, Wat er door de theologische faculteit te Leyden al zoo geleerd en 
geleverd wordt: eene stem der smart en des beklags (Am terdam, 1857); “Leydsche 
beginselen,” De Tijdspiegel (1862), II, 393-408. 
43 LUL, BPL 3028, Johannes Jacobus Kotzé to Abraham Kuenen, 20 November 1863. 
44 On Geiger’s and Weil’s Koranforschung, see Susannah Heschel, Abraham Geiger and the 
Jewish Jesus (Chicago, 1998), 50-75 and Ruchama Jerusha Johnston-Blo m, “Oriental 
Studies and Jewish Questions: German-Jewish Encounters with Mohammed, the Qur’an, and 
Islamic Modernities” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 2013), 85-125. 
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(Jahwist) and “P” (Priestly Code) elements in the Pentateuch.45 Dozy repeatedly referred to 
this book, most notably in Het islamisme from 1863.46 It is this combination of factors that 
helps explain why a book like De Israëlieten te Mekka could emerge from Leiden’s 
theological faculty: its theme was timely and its method consistent with Biblical studies as 
practiced by Kuenen.  
 Given the contested character of both, it is also not surprising that, as Marx correctly 
noticed, De Israëlieten te Mekka drew response from far and wide, often in the form f 
journal articles that sometimes ran to dozens of pages.47 Authors with a penchant for dramatic 
generalization used Dozy’s book as an occasion for lament over the sorry state of modern 
science, Leiden Oriental scholarship, or liberal theology in the Netherlands, while others, 
more focused on the sum and substance of Dozy’s arguments, wrote lengthy reviews to 
subject one or more of Dozy’s ideas to critical scrutiny. Judging by translations that appeared 
both in the Netherlands and abroad, some of these pi c s reached a readership beyond the 
                                                          
45 Emmanuelle Stefanidis, “The Qur’an Made Linear: A Study of the Geschichte des Qorâns’ 
Chronological Reordering,” Journal of Qur’anic Studies, 10 (2008), 1-22; Nicolai Sinai, 
“Orientalism, Authorship, and the Onset of Revelation: Abraham Geiger and Theodor 
Nöldeke on Muḥammad and the Qur’ān,” in Dirk Hartwig et al., eds.,“Im vollen Licht der 
Geschichte”: die Wissenschaft des Judentums und die Anfänge der kritischen Koranforschung 
(Würzburg: Ergon, 2008), 144-54. 
46 Dozy, Islamisme, 18, 31 n. 2, 75. 
47 Judging by his letters to Kruseman (LUL, LTK 1505, 24 August 1864; 3, 6, and 19 
September 1864; 17 October 1864; 13 November 1864) and De Goeje (LUL, BPL 2389, 11 
October 1864), Dozy monitored with great attention h w colleagues from near and abroad 
responded to this book. 
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academy. The highly critical response by Heinrich Ewald, “the pope of Göttingen,”48 for 
example, almost immediately appeared in Dutch translation, while John William Colenso, the 
Bishop of Natal who in the mid-1860s was engaged in bitter controversy over his own 
contributions to Biblical scholarship, kept an English-language audience informed with a 
translation of Henricus Oort’s brochure De dienst der Baälim in Israël (The Worship of 
Baalim in Israel, 1864).49 The most widely discussed response, in the Netherlands as well as 
abroad, was a long review by Karl Heinrich Graf, the German Old Testament scholar, who 
issued the devastating judgment that Dozy’s research, “carried out with so much acuteness 
and learning,” had a scholarly worth of “nothing, absolutely nothing.”50 Both the German 
original and the Dutch translation of this review were frequently quoted.51 
                                                          
48 M. J. de Goeje, “Bibliographisch album,” De Gids, 29 (1865), I, 531-48, at 531. 
49 H. Oort, The Worship of Baalim in Israel: Based Upon the Work of R. Dozy, “The Israelites 
at Mecca,” trans. John William Colenso (London, 1865). On Colenso’s interest in Dozy, see 
LUL, BPL 3028, Colenso to Abraham Kuenen, 3 February 1865; George W. Cox, The Life of 
John William Colenso, D. D., Bishop of Natal, vol. 1 (London, 1888), 223-5. In order to reach 
an international audience, the publisher also issued a German translation, which became a 
commercial disaster. In twelve years’ time, only 251 out of 1,500 copies were sold (J. W. 
Enschedé, A. C. Kruseman, vol. 2 [Amsterdam, 1902], 99-100). Nonetheless, the German 
edition contributed to the international reputation of Dozy’s work, witness the fact that not 
only German, but also English-language reviews such as t ose in The Westminster Review, 26 
(1864), 484 and The Saturday Review, 18 (1864), 372 based themselves on Die Israeliten zu 
Mekka. 
50 K. H. Graf, review in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 19 (1865), 
330-51, at 350. See also K. H. Graf to Eduard Reuss, 6 October 1864 and 6 May 1866, in K. 
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 At first sight, the debate over De Israëlieten te Mekka seemed to develop more or less 
along confessional lines. Thus, words of appreciation and admiration came primarily from the 
liberal side, that is to say, from authors who expected Biblical scholars to treat the Old and 
New Testaments in the same way that an ancient philolog st would treat the Iliad or Odyssey: 
with historical questions, philological methods, and a sound amount of skepticism vis-à-vis 
everything resembling myth or legend. It was no accident that many of these sympathizers 
had been trained or were employed at Leiden’s theological faculty. Even if these authors had 
not necessarily been accustomed to scholarly iconoclasm during their Leiden student years, 
they had all appropriated, in smaller or larger degre s, an ethos in which candid questions and 
bold hypotheses did not count as bad things per se. Apart from that, one suspects that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Budde and H. J. Holtzman, eds., Eduard Reuss’ Briefwechsel mit seinem Schüler und Freunde 
Karl Heinrich Graf (Giessen, 1904), 538, 564. 
51 E.g., A. Kuenen, “Simeonieten en Ismaëlieten: eene bijdrage tot de critiek van Dozy’s 
Israëlieten te Mekka,” Godgeleerde Bijdragen, 40 (1866), 449-515, at 449; X+Y [pseudonym 
of Meijer Roest Mzn.], “Boekbeschouwing,” Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad (1 September 
1865); H. Pierson, Baetyliëndienst (Arnhem, 1866), 45-7; Philip Elte, Moderne theologie in 
Nederland (Amsterdam, 1871), 8-9. According to HaCohen, Reclaiming the Jewish Bible, 145 
n. 34, the seven-part series of articles published under the pseudonym “X+Y” in the Nieuw 
Israëlietisch Weekblad was authored by Joseph Hirsch Dünner, the future chief rabbi of the 
Dutch Israelite Main Synagogue. M. Roest Mzn., “Brieven van een provinciaal over de 
Amsterdamsche opperrabbinaats-questie,” Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad (10 April 1874) 
reveals, however, that the first three articles were w itten by Meijer Roest, assistant librarian 
of the Royal Academy of Sciences and editor of the Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad. The 
remaining four articles came from Dünner’s pen. 
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appreciation that these Leiden scholars and alumni expressed for Dozy and his work reflected 
their personal acquaintance with the Orientalist.52 
 Criticism, by contrast, came primarily from Calvinists in the Netherlands Reformed 
Church as well as from orthodox Jews in both the Dutch and German language realms. The 
Reformed pastor H. A. Leenmans, for example, translated Graf’s critical review into Dutch in 
order to contribute, in his own words, to a battle against “a falsely named scholarship [eene 
valschelijk genaamde wetenschap]” that did not shrink from laying violent hands onGod’s 
holy Word.53 The revivalist magazine De Heraut also recommended this review, because 
Graf’s judgment nicely illustrated “how men of scholarship [wetenschap] in Germany treat 
the sort of products that are adored in this country with frantic applause…”54 Lambertus 
Tinholt, a Reformed pastor in Haarlemmermeer, even tri d to produce a reductio ad 
absurdum of Dozy’s critical method with an humorous parody that exposed Charles V as a 
fictional character and suggested a new dating for the entire Greek and Roman literary canon, 
which Erasmus was said to have fabricated on the bas of Aztec sources – complete with 
turns of phrases that seemed to have walked right out of Dozy’s book (“These assertions are 
                                                          
52 See esp. J. P. N. Land, “Een nieuwe lichtstraal op het Oude Verbond,” De Nederlandsche 
Spectator (1864), 227-9; Matthes, “Nieuwe ontdekking”; H. Oort, De dienst der Baälim in 
Israël: naar aanleiding van het geschrift van dr. R. Dozy “De Israëlieten te Mekka” (Leiden, 
1864). Land, Matthes, and Oort had defended their doctoral dissertations at Leiden in 1854, 
1859, and 1860, respectively. Another enthusiastic (anonymous) review appeared in the 
liberal periodical, De Onderzoeker, 6 (1865), 129. 
53 H. A. Leenmans, “Aan den lezer,” in De Israëlieten te Mekka van dr. R. Dozy, beoordeeld 
door dr. K. H. Graf, trans. H. A. Leenmans (Utrecht, 1866), iii-iv, at iv. 
54 De Heraut (6 October 1865), as cited in Enschedé, Kruseman, vol. 2, 97-8. 
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strange, but I will demonstrate that they are not unfo nded”).55 As Ran HaCohen has pointed 
out, the praise and blame of German-Jewish reviewers also showed a clear correlation to their 
position in the spectrum between orthodoxy and Reformjudentum.56 
This confessional topography, however, offers only a partial explanation of the variety 
of responses that Dozy’s book elicited. Despite their common liberal agenda, theologians such 
as Kuenen, Oort, J. P. N. Land, and J. C. Matthes judged De Israëlieten te Mekka very 
differently. This divergence was not only caused by philological differences of insight (how 
plausible was it to read the Hebrew baalath-beer as baal-habeer?). At least as decisive were 
different assessments of the virtues that scholars we e supposed to display in their work. How 
important, for instance, was the boldness that Dozy had exhibited by proposing, in Kuenen’s 
words, “a complete revolution in the field of Old Testament studies”?57 And how did this 
frankness relate to the accuracy and reliability required by the philological ethos? 
 
Dozy’s virtues 
                                                          
55 L. Tinholt, “Eene Jakoetische voorlezing uit de 38ste eeuw onzer jaartelling,” Stemmen 
voor Waarheid en Vrede, 1 (1864), 411-44, at 416. The Athenaeum, too, chose for ridicule by 
presenting Dozy’s book as a clever joke (“a rare hoax” and “brilliant travesty”) and the 
serious responses it elicited as giving Dozy lots of fun: The Athenaeum (1865), II, 797-99, at 
797. (I have been unable to identify the author of this piece.) Colenso objected to this 
treatment in J. W. Natal, “Israelites in Mecca,” The Athenaeum (1866), I, 497-8. Cf. Colenso 
to Charles Lyell, 1 March 1866, in George W. Cox, The Life of John William Colenso, D. D., 
Bishop of Natal, vol. 2 (London, 1888), 22. 
56 HaCohen, Reclaiming the Hebrew Bible, 145. 
57 A. Kuenen, “De Baälsdienst onder Israël,” Godgeleerde Bijdragen, 38 (1864), 449-91, 449. 
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Although Dozy’s critics had many grounds for disagreeing with each other, they shared at 
least one conviction: Dozy’s argument was “very inge ious.”58 Friends and foes alike praised 
Dozy’s “shrewdness” (scherpzinnigheid in Dutch or Scharfsinn in German) – the first of three 
virtues that were frequently referred to in the debat .59 No matter how they evaluated Dozy’s 
revisionist dating of the Pentateuch or his etymology f “Abraham” and “Sarah,” almost all 
participants in the debate agreed that the author had a “sharp eye” and that he excelled in 
“sagacity,” “sound criticism,” and “penetration.”60 Philologically oriented historians often 
presented this virtue of shrewdness as a necessary condition for critical source examination: it 
was considered indispensable for disentangling layers of meaning in historical texts and for 
unraveling textual dependencies.61 Although shrewdness could, of course, overstep its bounds 
– some scholars warned against the danger of excessive, “hair-splitting shrewdness,”62 just as 
others worried that “criticism” could degenerate into “hyper-criticism”63 – it was regarded as 
a key virtue, provided the right dose was maintained. 
                                                          
58 John William Colenso, The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined, vol. 5 
(London, 1865), 265. See also The Saturday Review, 16 (1864), 372. 
59 De Goeje, “Stap vooruit,” 301; Kuenen, “Baälsdienst onder Israël,” 480; Matthes, “Nieuwe 
ontdekking,” 364. Along similar lines: Godgeleerde Bijdragen, 38 (1864), 350-1, at 350 and 
Historische Zeitschrift, 13 (1865), 270-2, at 272. 
60 Matthes, “Nieuwe ontdekking,” 351; N. de Khanikoff, review in Journal Asiatique, 4 
(1864), 433-49, 433. 
61 Ernst Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode: mit Nachweis der wichtigsten 
Quellen und Hülfsmittel zum Studium der Geschichte (Leipzig, 1889), 296-7. 
62 Ernst Bernheim, Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsphilosophie (Göttingen, 1880), 71. 
63 See, e.g., “Rinck dritter Brief Pauli an die Corinther,” Heidelberger Jahrbücher der 
Literatur, 16 (1823), 529-44, at 535; Christian Kapp, Über den Ursprung der Menschen und 
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 This applies to a lesser extent to a second quality that was ascribed to Dozy: the “talent 
for conjecture” (gave van combinatie) that allowed scholars to discern patterns in their source 
material and to make a story out of them.64 Both Kuenen and Graf praised Dozy’s “gift for 
conjecture” (Combinationsgabe) and “ability to conjure” (Combinationsfertigkeit)65 – an 
ability that “organizes the data into fruit-bearing results,” as the German historian Ernst 
Bernheim would explain in his Lehrbuch der historischen Methode (1889).66 Unlike 
shrewdness, which was primarily regarded as important for source criticism, this talent for 
conjecture was regarded as needed especially for what Bernheim called “interpretation” 
(Auffassung): the formulation of hypotheses and the making of causal inferences. Not 
everyone, however, was equally charmed by this aspect of historical scholarship. Influenced 
by the philological ethos that made its impact felt also on the German 
Altertumswissenschaften,67 some held that “interpretation” was not possible before “criticism” 
had done its work. Hypotheses, moreover, required a “creative intuition” that was difficult to 
codify by methodological means and therefore sat rel iv ly uncomfortably with a view of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Völker, nach der mosaischen Genesis (Nuremberg, 1829), 193; Karl August Credner, 
Einleitung in das Neue Testament, vol. 1 (Hall, 1836), 338 or, in the Netherlands, [R. C. 
Bakhuizen van den Brink], “Kritiek, hyperkritiek, onkritiek: nalezingen op Labruyères Des 
ouvrages de l’esprit,” De Gids, 3 (1839), 476-83, 513-22. 
64 [Hofstede de] G[root], “Oorsprong van de Mohamedaansche godsdienst,” 373.  
65 Kuenen, “Baälsdienst onder Israël,” 480; Graf, review, 331. 
66 Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, 430. 
67 See Ulrich Muhlack, “Historie und Philologie,” in Muhlack, Staatensystem und 
Geschichtsschreibung: ausgewählte Aufsätze zu Humanis us und Historismus, Absolutismus 
und Aufklärung, ed. Notker Hammerstein and Gerrit Walther (Berlin, 2006), 142-72. 
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scholarship that put a premium on methodological control.68 Praise for Dozy’s “talent for 
conjecture” therefore amounted to taking a stance i debates over the nature and priorities of 
geisteswissenschaftliche r search. 
 The joy with which Hendrik Pierson, a Reformed pastor in Heinenoord, welcomed De 
Israëlieten te Mekka provides a telling example of this. In Pierson’s asessment, the priority 
that Biblical scholars had long been assigning to “criticism” had led to an overabundance of 
negative results: 
 
she made everything empty, barren, many a flower sh had torn apart, many an 
illusion she had destroyed and even though we had to endorse that she eradicated 
foreign plants, which had been proven not to be at home in the garden, we did not 
receive anything in return and witnessed how everything was gradually turned into a 
wasteland.69 
 
Consequently, “our soul thirsts for positive result,” as Pierson wrote with an allusion to 
Psalm 42. Even if Dozy’s hypotheses turned out not to be correct, it was a relief so see a 
senior scholar mustering the courage to draw firm lnes through the ancient history of Israel.70 
 Accordingly, a third virtue attributed to Dozy was “frankness” (vrijmoedigheid) or 
“boldness” (koenheid). Dozy’s “bold hypothesis,” wrote Kuenen in 1870, six years after 
publication of De Israëlieten te Mekka, had provided a “salutary shock” to many in the fields 
                                                          
68 Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, 430. 
69 H. Pierson, De heilige steenen in Israël: naar aanleiding van het boek van prof. R. Dozy: 
“De Israëlieten te Mekka” (Rotterdam, 1864), 6. 
70 Ibid., 7. 
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of Biblical and Oriental studies and stimulated a greater amount of “frankness.”71 In Kuenen’s 
vocabulary, “frankness” could mean two things. On the one hand, it was the courage required 
for launching a hypothesis in the absence of indisputable proofs or logically compelling 
inferences.72 On the other, it was the bravery to defy the power of religious traditions73 – a 
virtue that Kuenen appreciated not only in Dozy, but also in Colenso, who in spite of much 
opposition published one critical study of the Pentateuch after another.74 Likewise, the 
Amsterdam philosopher and Orientalist Jan Pieter Nicolaas Land characterized Dozy as a 
“stout-hearted” (stoute) scholar, who like a brave general “ventures a campaign deeply into a 
country of which he possesses only very general maps.”75 
 Land realized that not every reader would classify this daredevilry as a virtue 
conducive to historical understanding. He therefore added that Dozy’s deficiencies were 
nothing but “les défauts de ses qualités”: every achievement, after all, comes with a price.76 
This price, however, divided Dozy’s critics, too. Each of the three virtues mentioned so far 
was contested, although on different grounds. In the Jewish Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad 
(New Israelite Weekly), the future Amsterdam chief rabbi Joseph Hirsch Dünner, for 
example, agreed that Dozy’s criticism was ingenious. He added, however, that Dozy had not 
been critical enough, given that he had disregarded th  “first requirements of true criticism,” 
                                                          
71 A. Kuenen, “Critische bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van den Israëlietischen godsdienst,” 
Theologisch Tijdschrift, 4 (1870), 391-426, at 406. 
72 A. Kuenen, De godsdienst van Israël tot den ondergang van den Joodschen staat, vol. 2 
(Haarlem, 1870), 27, 173, 214, 272, 311, 428, 537. 
73 Ibid., 521. 
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namely a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language.77 Apparently, criticism could be 
practiced in different degrees, so that the question was not whether Dozy was critical, but to 
what extent he was so. Secondly, more did not always count as better. Kuenen, for instance, 
warned that “frankness” could easily turn to “recklessness.”78 This shows that the Old 
Testament scholar was indebted to an Aristotelian understanding of virtue as a juste milieu 
between two vices – cowardice and recklessness in the case of frankness. In this line of 
thought, it was not sufficient to observe that Dozy displayed shrewdness, a talent for 
conjecture, and frankness or boldness. Decisive was rather the question whether he practiced 
these virtues to an extent that prevented them fromdegenerating into vices. 
 
Dozy’s vices 
This brings us to the storm of criticism that De Israëlieten te Mekka elicited. Whereas 
scholarly praise was often formulated in terms of virtues, critics usually focused on vices. 
And whereas supporters frequently spoke in terms of “light” and “darkness” – about the dark 
                                                          
77 X+Y [pseudonym of Joseph Hirsch Dünner], “Boekbeschouwing,” Nieuw Israëlietisch 
Weekblad (29 December 1865). Similar complaints about modern historians who turned out 
not to as “critical,” “impartial,” or “truth-loving” as they claimed to be were frequently issued 
among orthodox Protestants in fear of modern Biblical criticism and among Roman Catholics 
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Robert Fruin in [Herman] Schaepman, “Een nieuw verwijt uit een oude doos,” De Wachter, 2 
(1872), II, 26-47, at 35; W. F. N. van Rootselaar, “De geschiedschrijver prof. dr. R. Fruin,” 
De Katholiek, 109 (1896), 26-62, at 35 and 48-50; ibid., “De geschiedschrijvers: Ranke en 
Fruin,” De Katholiek, 110 (1896), 180-96, at 196. 
78 Kuenen, “Critische bijdragen,” 406. 
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origins of Islam, for instance, which Dozy’s book supposedly helped clarify79 – opponents 
preferably employed architectural metaphors. They called De Israëlieten te Mekka n 
assemblage of “groundless” or “unfounded” hypotheses, an edifice without proper 
foundations, or a vault resting on “such mutually supporting rib stones . . . that the most 
profitable lesson one can draw from the book is howdangerous such edifices are.”80 In Graf’s 
wording: 
 
Everyone else would regard the results that are present d here with great confidence as 
indisputably proven historical facts as a web of light-hearted hypotheses, daring and 
adventurous inferences and conjectures, and be surprised at the rashness with which 
the most far-reaching conclusions are often drawn from unproven assumptions . . . 
Everything floats in the air, nothing rests on a firm, scholarly smoothed ground, 
everywhere the lack of solid critical rules is manifested in a most strident manner.81 
 
                                                          
79 De Goeje, “Stap vooruit,” 298; Matthes, “Nieuwe ontdekking,” 349-51; Oort, Dienst der 
Baälim, 2, 55; LUL, BPL 2487, William McGuckin de Slane to Reinhart Dozy, 3 February 
1865. 
80 Ewald, review, 1270; C. H. van Herwerden CHz., “Over de steenen- en boomendienst van 
Israël,” Waarheid in Liefde (1865), I, 377-98, at 378 and 379; Moritz Steinschneider, review 
in Hebraeische Bibliographie, 7 (1864), 103-06, at 105. See also Heinrich Leberecht 
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81 Graf, review, 350. 
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As this diatribe illustrates, “rashness” (lichtvaardigheid) or “levity”  (lichtzinnigheid) was the 
first vice that was held responsible for the fragility of Dozy’s edifice. According to Ewald, 
Dozy’s lack of serious study was evidenced by the “vast number of continuously new and 
continuously more far-reaching errors” on which the author treated his readers.82 Especially 
Dozy’s etymological inferences elicited fierce criti ism. As Meijer Roest declared in the 
Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad: “These hypotheses rest on textual conjectures that teach us an 
Hebrew which would make an Isaiah’s hair stand on end…”83 To be sure, the point was not 
that Dozy made factual errors, although some Jewish cr tics were eager to point out that 
Dozy’s command of the Hebrew language did not surpass that of a “Jewish school boy.”84 
The point was rather that the way for such errors wa paved by what Ludwig Philippson 
called the “levity” of Dozy’s working manners.85 
 In this context, Dozy was also found guilty of other vices. Critics seeking to express a 
greater sense of indignation spoke about intellectual “audacity.” According to the Dutch-
Jewish critic Philip Elte, for example, it was an “i solence” (aanmatiging) and “impudence” 
(brutaliteit) to present far-reaching hypotheses without a proper awareness of complications 
and alternatives.86 Others qualified Dozy’s findings as “premature” (voorbarig), given that 
they ran ahead of more thorough and detailed study.87 This accusation stemmed from the 
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Weekblad (18 August 1865). 
84 Elte, Moderne theologie, 30. 
85 [Ludwig Philippson], “Literarischer Wochenbericht,” Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums, 
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belief (briefly referred to above) that all relevant “facts” had to be established before a scholar 
could hazard an “interpretation.” As the Leiden historian Robert Fruin recommended in 1865: 
“Do not begin with the building before the material h s been gathered and prepared.”88 
 Finally, Dozy was accused of “prejudice” and “dogmatism,” because of his tendency 
to explain difficult passages so as to make them fit his purposes. Whoever translates gilgal 
with “round heap of stones,” wrote the Reformed pastor C. H. van Herwerden, does not do so 
on etymological grounds, but out of “love for his theory.”89 Likewise, J. P. N. Land declared: 
“Captivated by the idea that Jahwist scribes had rewo ked the older history in their own 
manner, [Dozy] is often satisfied with particularly weak arguments as long as these contribute 
to portraying ancient Israel as thoroughly pagan.”90 Accordingly, Henricus Oort, the future 
Leiden professor of theology, concluded that Dozy had succumbed to a classic temptation: 
 
If one thinks one has found a track that yields surprising results, one is easily temped 
to follow that track, to put in the forefront whatever seems to prove its correctness, and 
to close the eye to everything that speaks against it. One quickly finds what one hopes 
to find; this leads many an acute man of learning astray.91 
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As a matter of fact, not only Dozy, but also his crowd of enthusiastic followers was accused 
of such dogmatism. As the Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad declared in a biting comment on the 
debate: 
 
Professor Dozy writes “The Israelites in Mecca” and all liberal theologians, headed by 
Prof. De Goeje, look on amazed and struck dumb by those heavenly r velations from 
Sinai, no at Leiden. They are inexhaustible in their cheers, they dance and shout with 
joy like the Egyptians when Apis honors them with a visit. Kuenen writes “The 
Religion of the Israelites” [in the same series, “The Most Important Religions,” in 
which Dozy’s Het islamisme had appeared] and the entire choir of liberal theologians 
sings Hallelujah, yea is seized with convulsion caused by joy. So it is hardly possible 
for our pastors not to vow on the oracles of the great masters who, for the benefit of 
their loyal, credulous disciples, are busily brewing brand new revelations.92 
 
Dozy for his part complained about the vices of his cr tics. In correspondence with his 
publisher, he accused the Jewish scholar Moritz Steinschneider of “dishonesty” 
(oneerlijkheid) in summarizing his arguments93 and Meijer Roest of systematically 
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“distorting” his position and wrenching words from their context – abuses that he attributed to 
“helpless anger” (magtelooze woede) and “theological hatred.”94 In Dozy’s view, Ewald also 
collected vices by the dozen by taking “the celebrity of any opinion not emanating from 
himself” as a “sufficient reason for condemning and contradicting it.”95 So, at first sight, it 
seems as if Dozy and his critics all proceeded from the assumption that scholarship would 
flourish as long as virtues would be practiced and vices avoided. 
 
Constellations of virtues 
Crucial, however, was that unanimity about the relative importance of these virtues and vices 
did not exist. We already noticed that “frankness” was considered a virtue only as long as it 
was practiced to a right extent. This explains why Graf could condemn excessive “stout-
heartedness” as “adventurousness”96 and why Kuenen did not complain about Dozy’s method 
as such, but rather about its exaggeration: “So between Dozy and myself, only a difference as 
between more and less exists.”97 What mattered, therefore, was a right dose of frankness. But 
what counted as such a proper dose? Whereas some believed that the Leiden Orientalist was 
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guilty of “pretentious” and “insolent” conduct, others appreciated his “bold” and “daring” 
ideas. 
 This divergence, in turn, was related to the degre in which the critics saw Dozy’s 
virtues as being kept in balance by other virtues. If shrewdness is not checked by accuracy, 
wrote Graf, an etymologist can “make anything out of everything.” And if the “sense of 
detection” that comes with well-developed shrewdness is not to deteriorate into phantasy, it 
has to be restrained by methodical “rules and laws.”98 In a similar vein, Philippson sighed: 
 
For a long time, experience has taught that learning and shrewdness are not sufficient 
for practicing true criticism, but that it also takes a dose of common sense. One knows 
what kind of absurdities have been put forward these days by very learned and shrewd 
critics, because they were just learned and shrewd, but did not possess sufficient 
common sense to set a limit to their critical nonsense.99 
 
In this view, then, historical research required constellations of virtues, that is, well-balanced 
combinations of, say, shrewdness and reliability, or frankness and skepticism vis-à-vis 
adventurousness. Scholars were, in other words, not supposed to practice single virtues at the 
expense of others. This has an important implication for the study of virtue language in 
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nineteenth-century scholarship. If relations between virtues were as important as the passages 
just quoted suggest, then a key element of this virtue discourse is ignored as long as historical 
epistemologists focus just on individual virtues. 
 There are two further reasons as to why questions l ke “Did Dozy possess a talent for 
conjecture?” and “What did accuracy mean in the 1860s?” are misleading in their simplicity. 
One is that several participants in the debate believ d in scholarly divisions of labor and, 
consequently, in differentiated requirements for individual scholars. Pierson, for example, 
declared with an allusion to Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians (12,4) that there are 
“diversities of spirits”: “it is another that criticizes and another that makes conjectures. The 
special intellectual gifts of the shrewd critic [den scherpzinnigen beoordelaar] re not easy to 
reconcile with the ability to conjure [het vermogen om te combineren] that is the first 
requirement for forming hypotheses.”100 Following this line of reasoning, Dozy could allow 
himself one-sidedness in order to correct the one-sid dness of others. In a debate that tended 
to get bogged down in details, an overdose of frankness was, in Pierson’s view, less 
inappropriate than in a debate that badly needed cautious testing of wild hypotheses. 
 Varying on this argument, other reviewers mentioned the stimulus provided by Dozy’s 
intervention. The German-Jewish Orientalist Gustav Weil, for example, expected that, despite 
or precisely because of its forced inferences and unlikely hypotheses, De Israëlieten te Mekka 
would give a major impetus to new research, “which will further scholarship.”101 Matthes, 
too, stated that “this work stimulates one’s thought and inspires new, serious research.”102 
Pierson even wondered what was wrong with periodical eruptions of shrewdness and 
creativity like Dozy’s. “As long as we do not value our phantasies as positive proofs and 
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regard them tentatively as nothing more than experiments, I do not think there is any 
objection against making them public.”103 Although this might have been said out of 
politeness, the words just quoted express a view of scholarship in which not an individual’s 
result, but the contribution that individuals make to an ongoing scholarly conversation 
counted as most important. In so far as Weil, Matthes, and Pierson endorsed this view, they 
assigned less weight to an individual’s ability to achieve a balance of virtues than to a balance 
achieved over time, by the collective efforts of the scholarly community.104 
 In sum, then, the debate prompted by Dozy’s book reveals no less than four reasons as 
to why virtues in nineteenth-century scholarly discourse cannot be studied in isolation from 
each other. The extent to which Oriental and Biblical scholars in the 1860s welcomed 
accuracy, shrewdness, and frankness depended on (1)the extent to which these virtues were 
practiced, (2) the extent to which they were kept in balance by other virtues, (3) the extent to 
which they were balanced by other scholars’ virtues, and (4) the extent to which it was 
expected that they would be balanced by future scholars’ work. 
 
A divided house 
The fact that all these variables figured in the debat  prompted by De Israëlieten te Mekka 
does not, of course, imply that all participants asigned equal importance to them. We have 
observed that Dozy’s critics did not agree on the crit ria for measuring (1), that they differed 
on the relative importance of (2), and that, for authors such as Ewald and Philippson, (3) and 
(4) hardly played a role at all. In other words, Dozy’s critics employed different standards of 
inquiry and, consequently, arrived at different judgments about the scholarly value of Dozy’s 
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book. While Land evaluated it as a scholarly contribution par excellence,105 Ewald and 
Philippson concluded that De Israëlieten te Mekka had nothing whatsoever to do with “true 
scholarship.”106 The French Orientalist Gustave Dugat therefore hit the nail on the head: “This 
book is, according to some, the best and, according to others, the worst of all [Dozy] has 
written.”107 
 As Ran HaCohen has shown, confessional divisions ctribute much to explaining this 
divergence of views.108 By and large, orthodox Jews were more skeptical of m dern Biblical 
criticism than their liberal fellow-believers, just as Calvinist voices in the controversy over De 
Israëlieten te Mekka were, with some exceptions, more dismissive of Dozy’s methodology 
than liberal ones. However, not all difference with regard to the variables (1) to (4) can so 
easily be explained under reference to religious positions on a spectrum between orthodoxy 
and liberalism. Constellations of virtues also depended on methodological beliefs, two of 
which need to be signaled out here in order to explain the mixed response that Dozy drew 
even among scholars with broadly similar theological views. 
One matter in dispute was the question whether Biblical or Oriental scholarship still 
lived up to its wissenschaftliche vocation if it left the realm of philological detail in order to 
engage in work of synthesis. As Sabine Mangold and others have shown, among German 
Orientalists in the mid-nineteenth-century the prestig  of philological precision as advocated 
by Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer and his numerous pupils was such that their philological 
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ethos came close to being identified with Wissenschaft as such.109 This left little room for the 
more ambitious view expounded by Kuenen, among others, that narrative synthesis was the 
end of all scholarship – even though it might take  lifetime, or even generations, to prepare a 
proper, critical “foundation” for it.110 The more, indeed, Dozy’s critics identified philological 
precision with scholarship as such, the shaper was their verdict about “the witty, cheerful 
Dozy,” as the Swedish Orientalist Carlo Landberg put it condescendingly in 1886.111 
 In the years following the publication of De Israëlieten te Mekka, a second 
methodological fault line emerged among Orientalists in Europe. While Dozy belonged to a 
generation that considered classical texts as their most important objects of study, during the 
1880s this approach increasingly met with opposition fr m ethnographically oriented modes 
of study that paired texts to other kinds of source material and used these texts, not as 
worthwhile in themselves, but as means for addressing non-philological questions. Dismissive 
of the philologische Kleinarbeit embodied by Fleischer and, especially, his students, a 
younger generation of Orientalists, which included such future heavyweights as Ignác 
Goldziher and Martin Hartmann, deliberately focused on historical and anthropological 
questions, which required more than the philological methods that had dominated Orientalism 
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in the mid-nineteenth century.112 Unsurprisingly, such protests against the philological ethos 
of the Fleischer school emerged not only in Europe. Ottoman scholars, too, complained about 
European professors who pretended to be specialists in Arabic without ever having taken the 
trouble of leaving their study or library. From Beirut, for example, Ibrahim al-Yaziji judged 
about Dozy: 
 
In spite of all research proficiency, in spite of the high ambitions, in spite of all 
patience in observing and writing, the man lacked the best means for understanding 
the Arabic language, the classical and the modern alike, because, to our knowledge, he 
has never traveled to one of the Arabic-speaking countries, such as Egypt or Syria, and 
conversed orally with only few Arabs, but learned the language solely from books, 
with help of people among his fellow-countrymen whom are called Orientalists.113 
 
Near the time of Dozy’s death, similar criticisms came to be heard at Leiden. In 1880, De 
Goeje’s most talented pupil, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, did not devote his doctoral 
dissertation to old Arabic texts, but to the still-existing “Meccan festival.” Moreover, among 
the sources Snouck consulted for this study were such unconventional ones as travelogues of 
recent Western visitors to Mecca.114 A few years later, in 1884, Snouck would even undertak  
an expedition to Mecca in order to see the center of Islam with his own eyes. With such 
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“fieldwork,” usually on behalf and/or with financial means provided by the Dutch colonial 
administration, Snouck embarked on a new type of research. Some polite words about his 
Doktorgroßvater notwithstanding, Snouck’s scholarship of the 1880s displayed very little 
affinity with Dozy’s work in the 1860s. Not only Dozy’s “speculation,” but also his 
philological “groundwork” was called into question.115 
 If methodological fault lines, apart from confessional dividing lines, help explain the 
different views that Dozy’s critics adopted vis-à-vis the variables (1) to (4) identified in the 
previous section, can the same be said about their academic affiliations, or the lack thereof? 
Nineteenth-century Orientalism was, after all, a field in which academics found themselves 
accompanied by what Lawrence Conrad calls “a broad ange of explorers, adventurers, and 
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travelers: missionaries, theologians, and preachers; eccentrics, frauds, and crackpots; social 
reformers, political advocates, soldiers, spies, and diplomatic representatives of various 
European regimes.”116 Although not all of these intervened in the debate ov r De Israëlieten 
te Mekka, the company of Dozy’s critics indeed included quite a few non-academic scholars, 
such as rabbis, pastors, and journalists. It would be mistaken, however, to assume that those 
with university positions distinguished themselves en bloc from those without. One reason is 
that pastors could be future professors, or eager to p esent themselves as such, as illustrated 
by Henricus Oort (who obtained a chair after twelve years of pastoral service).117 Another is 
that academic affiliation as such did not make a serious conversation partner: the Göttingen 
professor Heinrich Ewald was depicted in the blackest possible terms by several of his 
colleagues (“a self-deifying man [Selbstvergötterer] who is more or less ripe for the 
madhouse,” Fleischer judged in 1865).118 
 Robert Irwin therefore rightly concludes that “there was hardly an Orientalist type or a 
common Orientalist discourse” in Europe, especially once the heydays of the Fleischer school 
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were over.119 In religious, methodological, as well as institutional respects, diversity seemed 
the norm. Perhaps this makes it all the more significant that none of Dozy’s critics judged De 
Israëlieten te Mekka by the standard of a single virtue, but weighed the author’s virtues and 
vices, even while putting forward different catalogues of virtues. So, if even Orientalists of 
the most varied stripes agreed that constellations of virtues mattered more than accuracy or 
shrewdness as such, shouldn’t this insight be taken to heart by historical epistemologists 
working on virtues and vices in nineteenth-century scholarly discourse? 
 
Conclusion 
My primary purpose in examining the reception history f De Israëlieten te Mekka has not 
been to develop new insight into mid-nineteenth-century Orientalism. Instead, I have 
examined the controversy surrounding Dozy’s book in order to raise a methodological issue 
regarding the study of what Lorraine Daston calls “the history of categories that structure our 
thought.”120 Although it is widely recognized that these categories include virtues and vices, 
historical epistemologists and intellectual historians more generally have studied these virtues 
and vices almost exclusively on an individual base, without sufficiently recognizing that the 
meaning and significance of such virtues and vices in actual scholarly practice depended to no 
small degree on their relations to other, competing, complementary, and/or overlapping 
virtues and vices. More specifically, the 1864 contr versy analyzed in this article suggests 
that what qualified as virtues in the context of mid-n neteenth-century Biblical and Oriental 
studies depended on (1) the extent to which shrewdnss, frankness, and so forth were 
practiced, (2) the extent to which these virtues were k pt in balance by other virtues, (3) the 
extent to which they were balanced by other scholars’ virtues, and (4) the extent to which it 
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was expected that they would be balanced by the work of future scholars. Even though some 
Orientalists, such as Ewald, rejected the variables (3) and (4), the fact that they deemed it 
irrelevant to judge Dozy’s work in the light of other scholars’ contributions reveals that they 
had taken a stance on these issues with implications for what they recognized as proper, 
“virtuous” scholarly conduct. 
 Secondly, the controversy examined in this article reveals that Orientalists and Biblical 
scholars in the 1860s subscribed to different catalogues of virtues and, consequently, failed to 
reach agreement on standards of “virtuous” scholarly conduct. I have argued that this 
disagreement did not merely exist between “professionals” and “amateurs,” or between 
scholars in and outside the academy, but within the worlds of Biblical and Oriental studies 
themselves. This divergence increased, moreover, when in the 1880s a younger generation of 
Orientalists began to rebel against the philological inheritance of the Fleischer school. This 
implies that constellations of virtues, as I have called them, were fragile in at least two 
respects. Not only were scholars supposed to keep a d licate balance between a number of 
different virtues, but also the equilibrium itself was unstable, given that the assumptions 
defining what constituted a constellation of virtues were subject to change. 
 In order to give such constellations of virtues the attention they deserve, historical 
epistemology as currently practiced needs more than just expansion of its focus on individual 
virtues. It also needs to supplement the study of ideals of virtue such as articulated in 
programmatic texts (inaugural addresses) and codifying manuals (educational textbooks) with 
detailed examination of how virtues and vices actually functioned in the context of scholarly 
debates, controversies, and polemics. For the relativ  significance of “impartiality” or 
“shrewdness” was nowhere as apparent as when catalogues of virtues and vices clashed. What 
noble ideals of virtue were worth in day-to-day scholarly practice became nowhere as clear as 
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when they were challenged by competing ideals.121 So, if historical epistemologists or 
intellectual historians more generally want to understand how and to what extent virtues and 
vices “structured” scholarly research and “patterned” scholarly discourse, these virtues and 
vices are best studied in such concrete historical settings as a journal’s book review section or 
a scholarly debate on the origins of Islam. 
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